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Armando F. Mastrapa, III
Department of
Government and Politics
St. John's University
Jamaica, New York
Prepared for the presentation at the 49th Annual Meeting of the New York State Political Science Association
April 28-29, 1995
Introduction
The balance of power in the modern era has been shaped to a certain extent by the use of force to obtain clear objectives, eg. wars fought for territorial expansion, that states pursue. Through this method of obtaining objectives, the state is willing to exact its interest. "A stance based on the fact that the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia". [1] "International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy". [2] The use of force is one factor that the state would utilize, but there may be another alternative, which would be peace, a peace that could bring a shared coexistence between states. "The emerging post-cold war scenario is marked by a dangerous and vexing vacuum., making it difficult to identify future security imperatives and therefore the formulation of appropriate strategies". [3] In reality, the relations among certain states still remain volatile. At any instance, tensions may arise bringing a crisis to the statesman. Would the state employ the use of force to carry out the nation's interest or would compromise bring a furthered peace with a rival nation? This is an interesting aspect in international relations, the very policy process that would enable a state to bring war to their nation or a shared peace.
Since the end of the Cold War, the proposition of war or peace still plagues the nation-state system. To further the danger of war that could bring the destruction of humanity, nuclear weapons proliferation has increased at an alarming pace. The Cold War brought the irrational notion of a nuclear war where one side would win. But both nations, the United States and the former Soviet Union, knew that nuclear war was a no win situation. "The United States as well as the Soviet Union intervened widely in others' affairs and spent a fair amount of time fighting peripheral wars". [4] Yet, the end of this super-power rivalry brought an uneasy reality that other proxy nations will and have acquired the materials to build a nuclear bomb to extend their geopolitical interests.
South Asia is one area in the geopolitical system that continues to grow within the international political sphere. The increase of population in India is just one example of such growth. India and Pakistan are two nations that have experienced war with each other--in 1947 over Kashmir, the Punjab area in 1965, and the Multan-Sind-Kutch region in 1971. As Arun P. Elhance points out in Stephen Philip Cohen's book, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control, "the larger political objectives in any of the three wars have never been clearly spelled out". [5] "A result of these directives has been the creation of a hard, forward-defended Zone of Defense on both sides, stretching continuously along the border". [6] Whether it is religious conflict, territorial claims, or security threats, both nations breath tension and hostility.
With an ever increasing spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the South Asian region does not escape this trend. The increase of nuclear proliferation is evident in the nuclear programs of both India and Pakistan. "Both countries are known to be accumulating relatively large stockpiles of nuclear explosive materials-plutonium and highly enriched uranium (uranium concentrated to over 20 percent uranium 235". [7] Such programs have furthered fears by the West of an escalation of nuclear weapons to counter and maintain a semblance of balance within South Asia.
In Rodney W. Jones' article "Old Quarrels and New Realities: Security in South Asia After the Cold War", he contends that:
Dramatic as the external changes are, they have done nothing to reduce the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Those countries are no less adversaries today than before. If anything, the events of the last decade deepened their hostility. Each alleges it has been the victim of "low- intensity war" and "subversion" by the other. Both continue to be plagued by an array of political crises and internal security problems, some explosive proportions, as in the case of the conflicts in Kashmir and Indian Punjab. Both are facing economic crisis, aggravated in both India and Pakistan by the effects of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, and in Pakistan also by the loss of foreign aid. Each is afflicted by government and or regime instability, internal political violence, and secessionist movements. [8]
The internal politics of each nation-state reflects the external political policy that each nation-state pursues.
This paper will address and outline the following issues India and Pakistan face that have increased the tension and proliferation of nuclear weapons on the South Asian continent: territory, religious diversity, economic conditions, Indian leadership, Pakistani leadership, and the nuclear issue.
Correlative Factors to Conflict
I. Territory
The issue of territory is one factor that has lead to conflict between India and Pakistan. The region of Kashmir has brought heated tension to both nations that has resulted in war. In Dr. S.P. Shulka's book, India and Pakistan: The Origins of Armed Conflict, it cites Michael Breecher's book The Struggle for Kashmir, that "between 1947 and 1955, there were several ups and downs marked by many events. The problem of Kashmir arose because Maharaja Hari Singh was unable to make up his mind to which Dominion the State of Kashmir should accede to or whether to accede at all". [9] "If Partition itself has been the subject of much anguished and rhetorical writings, so too has been the drama of the Kashmiri Maharaja's indecision about whether to join the Dominion of India, become an independent Kashmiri state, or become part of Muslim Pakistan". [10] The indecision by the Maharaja furthered the interest of territorial gains by both nations. To establish control over the Kashmir would bring territorial power to either state in the region. The religious demography also had an influence to the natural alliance of one of the states. "At the time of partition the State of Jammu and Kashmir, popularly called simply Kashmir, had an overall Muslim majority of 78 percent. In the most desirable part, the Vale of Kashmir, the Muslims numbered 93 per cent". [11]
Yet the exclusive majority of Muslims did not change the outcome of events in Kashmir. "Having a Hindu leader over a Muslim majority state, Pakistan's claim to the kingdom seemed to be justified on the basis of the two-nation theory. Moreover Kashmir's proximity to Pakistan also favored the Ratcliffe principle of grouping together contiguous Muslim majority areas. Following implicit Pakistani support for the tribal invasion into the valley to help their fellow Muslims, the Maharaja signed up to join India and received immediate military help. This led to outrage in Karachi and an immediate conflict between the two dominions". [12]
N.C. Chatterjee, a Hindu member of the Indian Parliament, pointed out in Muhammad Abdullah's article "Kashmir, India and Pakistan" in Foreign Affairs, that:
The [geography] of the State was such that it would be bounded on all sides by the new Dominion of Pakistan. Its only access to the outside world by road lay through the Jhelum Valley road which ran through Pakistan, via, Rawalpindi. The only rail line connecting the State with the outside world lay through Sialkot in Pakistan. Its postal and telegraphic services operated through areas that were certain to belong to the Dominion of Pakistan.
The State was dependent for all its imported supplies like salt, sugar, petrol and other neccesities of life on their safe and continued transit through areas that would form part of Pakistan.The tourist transit traffic which was a major source of income and revenue could only come via Rawalpindi. The only route available for the export of its valuable fruit was the Jhelum River which ran into Pakistan. [13]
With a Muslim religious majority and the geography of the Kashmir close to Pakistan, the natural assumption would be close ties Kashmir would have to Pakistan. But, the Indian position was quite different, "Indian spokesman single out two events as the "basic facts" in the Kashmir dispute and wish the rest of the world to infer from them that Pakistan has been the "aggressor" in Kashmir. The first is the tribal invasion of Kashmir, which began on 22 October 1947, and the second is the intervention of the Pakistani army inside Kashmir in the week of May 1948". [14] This correlation does not take into account that, "they completely ignore India's provocations that led to these developments and also that, first, the United Nations never pronounced Pakistan the aggressor and, second, these occurrences notwithstanding, India agreed in the United Nations that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future by plebiscite, thus making the holding of a plebiscite the central issue in the dispute". [15] With such a plebiscite the Kashmiri would decide their political fate. Ultimately, both states, India and Pakistan desired the Kashmir is to improve their geographic and political standing. The settlement of the dispute was best left to the parties in the conflict. "The handling of the Kashmir issue by the international community goes a long way to explaining India's antipathy to the role of "external" mediation in regional affairs. Following the United Nations fiasco, India was determined to solve the Kashmir crisis on the basis of bilateral relations with Pakistan". [16] Kashmir is still the most puzzling subject, if only because the Indian polity shows no desire to devise any policy addressing the clear message from the Kashmir valley and from its four million Muslim Kashmiri inhabitants, a message of near total isolation from India.
"Over the years Kashmir has become for all sections of national opinion in India, a test of Delhi's resolve to preserve India intact. After the 1947 Partition, Delhi hoped that the Muslim majority in Jammu and Kashmir would give the lie to Pakistan's religious foundation for nationhood. Kashmir would become living proof that secularism "worked." The disputed territory, which has caused two wars between India and Pakistan since 1947, entered a new phase after December 1989 with a situation of civil disobedience and wide popular support for various separatist groups". [17] Religious and political sensibilities in the Kashmir lent to uncertainty as to the political extension, ie. territory, of India or Pakistan. Both states vied for the position of influence to the Kashmiri issue. In a pattern of asserting political interest, India and Pakistan judged the territory issue as the geopolitical relationship in the South Asian region. Whether it be hostile or peaceful intentions, the issue of Kashmir's self determination is of interest to India and Pakistan that may result in the escalation of tensions or compromise.
II. Religious Diversity
The Hindu view of the world as other worldly and "the religious teachings of Hinduism and its belief system deeply influence the social behavior and political attitudes of its followers". [18] "Hindus have often been described as other-worldly and fatalistic because Hinduism teaches that an individual is bound in the cycle of birth and death. It is the karma (the action in one's life) that determines the nature of one's following life.". [19] The dominance of religion in politics has generally been negative. The association of theocratic states such as Iran, perpetuates an uncertainty to political decisions based on religious dogma. This is not to say that India and Pakistan are theocratic in governing, but the distinction of religious demography plays an important role in understanding a potential conflict between both nations. And yet, as S.M. Burke points out in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, "as a result of the unbridgeable gulf between Hinduism and Islam, their followers existed together in the same land for hundreds of years like two streams, which continue to run parallel to each other indefinitely, without ever becoming one body of water". [20] The following extended passage by S.M. Burke is worth quoting to illustrate this central theme:
Indeed, it is difficult to think of any two religions more anti-thetical to each other than Islam and Hinduism. Islam is the youngest of the universal religions. Its basic doctrine of belief is brief and explicit: belief in one all- powerful God, in Muhammad as his messenger, and in the Quran as the message. Hinduism, on the other hand, is an ancient religion and has no central dogma or agreed scripture: "Hinduism, as a faith, is vague, amorphous, many-sided, all things to all men". It is hardly possible to define it, or indeed to say definitely whether it is religion or not, in the usual sense of the word. [21]
Mahatma Gandi defined the Hindu creed simply as "search after the truth through non-violent means". [22] Many Hindus, however do not consider non-violence as an essential part of Hinduism. That of course is no definition at all. [23] While belief in one supreme God is the central theme in Islam, the Hindu pantheon comprises some 330 million gods and Radhakrishnan explains that all the gods stand for some aspect of the Supreme. [24] Hinduism is also heavily caste-ridden. For a person to belong to a caste in the Hindu society he must be born in it. ÔA convert is not born in a caste," said Ambedkar, the well known leader of the "untouchables", "therefore, he belongs to no caste". [25]
Islam, too, sets up a strong barrier of its own. It divides all humanity into two watertight compartments, Muslims and non-Muslims. All the Muslims, according to the Quran, belong to one brotherhood. [26] It follows, to use poet philosopher Muhammad Iqbal's words, that "there is only one millant [community] confronting the Muslim community, that of the non-Muslims taken collectively. [27] Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah pointed out that Islam imposes a duty on its followers not to merge their identity and individuality in any alien society. [28]. [29]
In an attempt to build bridges to the Hindu community, "the four most august sages in Hinduism are the shankaracharya who head famous monasteries. Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, has persuaded the four to preside over a new religious trust to build a temple to the warrior god Ram at Ayodhya, at the site of the disputed mosque that was demolished by Hindu fanatics in December 1992". [30]
III. Economic Conditions
The economic conditions that each nation endures is a factor that comes into the analysis if a conflict arises. A state's willingness to maintain its interests by extending a conflict to the point of war may be hampered by economic difficulties. For India and Pakistan, the future of economic development will be a decisive factor to policy determinations in a case of conflict. "The consolidation of the state through territorial integration and the establishment of effective political institutions were perceived by the leaders as preconditions for steady economic growth. India's leaders also realized that the country need industrial and agricultural revolutions if it was to enter the twentieth century. In particular, the key to the removal of the mass poverty existing in India was believed to be the application of science and technology to the utilization of the material and human resources of the country". [31] The process of development in the South Asian region has been gradually slow. "India's planned economic development as Asian region has been slow paced. "India's planned economic development has been directed toward (1) achieving a high economic growth rate, (2) building the country's industrial and technological self-reliance, (3) creating full employment, and (4) achieving social justice by removing the gross inequalities existing in society". [32] Yet the necessity for external support is evident in India's economy. The large population has affected the development process as well.
"Perhaps it is time to promote this notion again, this time more robustly. After all, a large share of India's external financing is provided by official creditors--the bilateral and multilateral aid donors. With the deepening external payment crisis, the importance of aid from the Paris Club grows accordingly. Even with the usual devices such as informal currency depreciation to keep exports competitive, India's chronic and structural imbalance in trade flows portends a constant need in the coming five years for external financing of the country's deficit". [33]
The case for Pakistan is not wholly different. Much of its external aid has been limited because of the perception of an increasing nuclear weapons program that would match that of India's. "Then the United States abruptly cut off almost all aid to Pakistan. The occasion was the annual presidential certification to Congress under the Presler amendment, due in October 1990. President George Bush was unable in this case to certify that Pakistan did not 'possess' a nuclear explosive device. An automatic aid suspension shut off all U.S. assistance not already in the pipeline. The cutoff preceded the election and installation of the new Pakistani government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and thus deprived Sharif of the opportunity to try to head off the rapture". [34] The impact of economic improvement is relevant to the expenditure of military programs. For instance, the estimate of The World Bank in their World Development Report, 1989 cites the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for India as 220,830 (million in US$) and for Pakistan 31,650 (million in US$). The added benefit of population and GDP supports India's effort to increase military expenditures to counter the Pakistani military threat. This is not to say that these factors are exclusive in assuring success in an armed conflict, but a stronger economy lends to a solid base in military readiness on either side.
"One of the most important components of national security for the states in South Asia involves the need to create continued economic growth and industrial development. Each South Asian state in turn has attempted to carry through an industrial revolution to end poverty, create gainful employment, and to increase trade. The process of political and economic change--collectively (if not still teleologically) referred to as development--keeps the positions of elites within the state precariously balanced even as it legitimates their right to rule". [35]
The perception that development would bring stability to a state may be realized through external assistance. Yet, it is not a guarantor of stability. "Development strategies generate instability by either failing to meet popular expectations of material advancement, or by failing to distribute the benefits of development equally". [36]
IV. Indian and Pakistani Leadership
Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao of India faces a national security threat not only from Pakistan but China as well. China has become an important player in the South Asian struggle for power. In addressing these threats Prime Minister Rao has assumed many leadership roles. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's publication from the Directorate of Intelligence, its Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments outlines the following positions filled by Rao: "Minister of Atomic Energy, Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Minister of Defense, Minister of Industry Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Minister of Non-Conventional Energy Sources, Minister of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Minister of Rural Development, Minister of Science and Technology, and Minister of Space". [37] The numerous titles that Rao has indicates a 'hands-on' approach with detail to government structure and control. In key positions such as Minister of Defense, Minister of Atomic Energy, and Minister of Science and Technology it would seem that the leadership is invested in one individual and little else for external advice. This may fashion policy decisions on one focus rather from a diverse corps of advisors.
The political structure of India's government might be characterized by a strong cohesion. "Along with political institutions and political parties, bureaucracy is an important element in that it helps ensure stability and administrative continuity. The bureaucracy of India consists of tenured civil servants who remain in their administrative posts even when their bosses lose their elective positions. The members of a bureaucracy are expected to make decisions on a rational rather than a political basis". [38]
"The government of India is a complex network of departments, bureaus, regulatory agencies, boards, and a host of commissions and autonomous organizations. Politicians head the departments; bureaucrats assist them in the administration of these departments. Key policy decisions are made by the members of the cabinet, which is also responsible for the coordination of the works of the various departments of the government". [39] This structural order has brought a semblance of democratic stability to India. External threats have furthered the readiness by the Indian government to counter issues of security. The development of nuclear weapons establishes a base of regional security from the Indian point of view. Yet, if one takes the realist perspective of international relations, the state is in constant struggle for power with other states in an anarchic system. Criticism of the realist paradigm points out, "realism fails to conceptualize the ways in which internal politics shapes and directs the foreign policy agenda". [40] And Caroline Thomas notes that, "the state-centric geopolitical approach to international relations is inadequate for conceptualizing the third world security environment". [41] To approach the international security issue in the third world, it must address a fundamental paradigm, the self-interest of the state. Indian military growth and developed nuclear capability provide the leadership ample political tools to address the threat to the Indian state. To provide for security, Indian leadership must believe in a self-preservation paradigm if it is to provide stability of the state from external factors that would ultimately affect the domestic politics of the state which critics of the realist paradigm believe is lacking in realist analysis.
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan faces a difficult road ahead for her state. The growing violence in Karachi is one example of an increasing proliferation of arms in Pakistan. As a result of arming the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, Pakistan faces an internal crises with leftover arms from the Afghani war. "Thus, Pakistan's future domestic tranquility remains hostage in special ways to the continuation of the warfare in Afghanistan. As spillover within Pakistan, drug running, arms smuggling, and the predatory attacks of armed gangs in the big cities and, in Sind, along the north-south road axis of communications, are persisting manifestations of the intra-Afghanistan conflict". [42]
The Nuclear Issue
The issue of nuclear proliferation on the South Asian continent has grown in importance since the end of the Cold War. Technology has played an important role in the development and production of nuclear weapons. The emergence of multi-polarity in the international political system contributes to the search for security within the regional areas of the world. In an attempt to meet the threat of external forces the states of India and Pakistan have developed technologies as their method to counter each other. "India and Pakistan are on the threshold of nuclear weaponization in a region that has significant border disputes and the world's highest incident of terrorist violence". [43] The weaponization of the region has presented a significant problem in policy planning by the Western states, particularly the United States. If there is a continued increase of nuclear weapons on the South Asian continent then this region will be a source of continued conflict into the next century. "Moreover, these lumbering monsters will inhabit a world made more dangerous in two new ways. The rivals of the coming century will be technologically capable of doing far more damage to each other, by nuclear and other means, than 19th-century European nation-states ever could. For the next few years they will also because of the cold war's end, have something special to quarrel about. The cold war locked large numbers of people inside countries they felt they did not belong to, or required them to live under dictatorships they hated". [44] The end of the Cold War brought a new realignment of the international political structure. This has changed the perceived structure of order. Rodney W. Jones points out:
In South Asia, the effects of declining Soviet power and rising U.S. prestige have been painfully disorienting to the traditional foreign policy elites. In both India and Pakistan, foreign policy makers and bureaucrats had successfully inculcated a high degree of doctrinal commitment and continuity among their intellectual supporters in the universities and communications media.
The current decline in superpower competition, however, drastically reduces the key source of developing country leverage--the option of playing one superpower off against the other. Because India and Pakistan have both exploited the cold war tension between the superpowers to achieve their ends--usually in opposite directions - the new situation will probably induce each to adjust its posture significantly. [45]
Reliance on superpower rivalry to further individual interests by India and Pakistan has been altered to the extent that proxy support of conflicts is not feasible in a new world order. The position of possessor and manufacturer of nuclear arms also entails prestige. "National security concerns and threat perceptions of nations are no doubt key factors in the process of proliferation. But a major motivating force can also be a desire to seek or enhance international prestige". [46] The factor of stability is also questioned when it pertains to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). "It is generally assumed that the emergence of new nuclear-weapons states will pose a grave threat to the 'systemic stability' that has characterized international relations since World War II". [47] Still the possession of a nuclear weapon is an option to have in an ever increasing anarchic system. "The fundamental attraction of nuclear weapons is that unilateral proliferation promises a dramatic shift in the balance of power. Unilateral possession opens the door to direct threats against non-nuclear states. It also limits the risks for aggressively minded states making conventional attacks on their neighbors because, in the event of a decisive reversal, the intended victim can be expected to be very reluctant to press for a total victory that would put the aggressor in a position of having nothing to lose". [48] In India's case, Pakistan does not represent the only threat. China is also a regional power to be reckoned with. Not only its population but China's conventional forces as well as nuclear forces provides a deterrence to the use of nuclear weapons. As S. Rashid Naim contends in Stephen Philip Cohen's book, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia:
The ultimate constraint on using nuclear weapons in a situation where both sides have them is of course Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). However, other international, regional, domestic, and geographic constraints, some fairly strong, also exist in South Asia.
Use of nuclear weapons in any but the most extraordinary situation is unlikely because because of several international and regional factors. For India, the main regional constraint is the China factor. Any use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan would have to take into consideration the impact on Chinese-Indian relations. Even if China were to stand by and do nothing, such an attack would be likely to lead to a nuclear arms race with China. [49]
Much of the analysis on South Asian proliferation presents China's importance to the nuclear question as well. "An examination of the dynamics of proliferation in South Asia shows that the China factor plays a crucial role. First, the Indian drive toward nuclear weapons capability has not been fueled by any necessity to check Pakistan. India, with its superior conventional strength, does not need nuclear weapons to counter a non-nuclear Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan was almost peripheral to Indian nuclear planning in the 1960s and most of the 1970s. Conversely, however, nuclear weapons can play a key role in Pakistani security plans to counter the growing military dominance of India in the region. The acquisition of nuclear weapons could be seen by Islamabad as providing a deterrent against an Indian invasion or a further Indian supported breakup of Pakistan". [50] In an interview with David Frost, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan was asked, if India has five bombs and Pakistan had five bombs, how would she see that comparison? She responded:
Well I don't see it in terms of nuclear weapons because Pakistan has always declared its policy as being a peaceful policy and despite the fact that after the Presler amendment all aid and assistance was cut off to Pakistan. We did not detonate a nuclear device, India did and I think the fact that it's ironic, that India which detonated a nuclear device does not have a law against it but Pakistan which has shown tremendous restraint has a law against it. [51]
Frost further asks, have you (Pakistan) detonated a nuclear bomb and do you have one? Prime Minister Bhutto replies:
We have neither detonated one nor do we have nuclear weapons. We have the capability and capacity to do it, but since we believe in non-proliferation, we would rather not do so. Unless, there was a severe threat that leaves us no other option, but being a responsible state and a state committed to non-proliferation. We in Pakistan through five successive governments have taken a policy decision to follow a peaceful nuclear program". [52]
"But according to U.S. government sources, Bhutto is not in control of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, although she has influence over it. Since the leaders appear unwilling or unable to constrain their nuclear weapons programs, these countries remain in a nuclear standoff. A military crisis might compel them to deploy nuclear arsenals, and risk a nuclear confrontation in South Asia. And if either country tests a nuclear explosive, the other will undoubtedly follow, unleashing a race for increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear weapons". [53]
The problem of Kashmir is one example in which furthered hostilities may arise. "Meanwhile, the Kashmir problem rose to the top of the local security agenda again in 1989-1990 and has remained there since. The Kashmir dispute is so acute that it evokes the specter of nuclear war in the subcontinent--a risk that seemed to become technically realistic in the late 1980s". [54] "Pakistani debate on the nuclear doctrine seems to have followed the line of thinking associated with the evolution of nuclear strategy elsewhere; that is, to adopt the general principles of deterrence, the main adversary being India".[55]
The position of national security and survival is present in the Indian and Pakistani viewpoints. But nationalism is also an important factor to policy determination. "A potent force propelling the Indian and Pakistani weapons programs is nationalism. This is evident from the national consensus in each country on nuclear policy. The rapid technological advances by Pakistan in recent years are a symbol of nationalistic pride in a country which has overcome major political, technical, and industrial, challenges to mount a program with a team of dedicated scientists. Pakistan is showing the world--as China did in the sixties--how a country with limited technical resources and a narrow industrial base can acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities by riding a wave of nationalism". [56]
Conclusion
Since an increase of proliferation in nuclear materials and technologies, the West has tentatively dealt with the issue of nuclear proliferation in the South Asian continent. Particularly, "the initial phase of the Clinton administration's policy in arms control was, as in other fields, marked by confusion and delay. Despite this, the administration's record on nuclear arms control is quite extensive". [57] The Clinton administration has addressed the concerns on nuclear proliferation in Russia, Ukraine, and North Korea while the South Asian issue has had limited attention.
If limited attention is given to the increase of nuclear weapons and technologies in South Asia then other geographic regions may pursue their own development programs. Specific treaties are to be enforced by signatories through economic inducements or through applied force. "With the failure to prevent indigenous development of weapons-related technologies or to plug technology leaks from the West, the focus now appears to be on ways to block or manage a nuclear arms race through regional confidence building measures as well as on outside influence derived from political, economic, and military cooperation". [58]
A reluctance to enforce such treaties sets forth a dangerous precedent in arms control. "In the absence of coercion to enforce the Nonproliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons are almost certain to spread. Indeed, even the threat of war might not halt proliferation. After all, what where once five declared nuclear states became eight-temporarily, at least-with the breakup of the Soviet Union. (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine joined Russia.) Three other former Soviet republics - Armenia, Estonia and Lithuania - possess nuclear rectors or research centers, although they have joined the treaty. At least three additional nations - India, Israel and Pakistan - have either an atomic arsenal or the ability to build one quickly". [59]
Therefore, it is up to the Western states to monitor and strictly enforce the treaties through political and economic means in order to ensure a balance of nuclear proliferation in the world. The political means would be diplomatic pressure and sanctions through economic policies. South Asia's descent into a slippery slope of nuclear weaponization creates instability and cause for alarm if other states follow suit in nuclear capabilities. "Pakistan and India can choose to aggravate or prevent a weapons competition. Unless they constrain their nuclear weapons research and development programs, these programs could create institutional momentum within each country to build and test nuclear weapons. And if either country tests or deploys, the other is sure to follow, with dangerous consequences for the security of South Asia and the rest of the world. A test or deployment of nuclear weapons could also cripple current efforts to stop other developing countries such as Argentina and Brazil from "going nuclear", and perhaps even undermine the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Several nations may find it politically difficult to be considered inferior to Pakistan in nuclear matters". [60]
One of many policy determinations of non-proliferation would be increasing the cost of manufacturing and obtaining materials. "The concerns that have been expressed for decades about the dangers of nuclear proliferation are obviously real. Thus, if raising the national costs of obtaining nuclear weapons is an insufficient barrier to proliferation the United States cannot resign itself to the unimpeded spread of weapons of mass destruction". [61]
The concerted effort by Western states to increase the value of purchasing and manufacturing nuclear materials is an important policy that would hamper the developing states' quest in obtaining nuclear arms. A measured economic incentive is another viable tool that the West can use to persuade other states not to seek nuclear arms. This is true in regard to the developing nations who are in difficult economic expansion or for that matter growth. They favor economic assistance and the prospect of trade as an attempt to provide stability and economic incentives for developed nations to invest.
In the case of India and Pakistan, regional rivalry will precipitate the desire for nuclear arms. Through arms control treaties as well as economic incentives, the spiraling weaponization on the South Asian continent may subside. The rise of China as an economic and military power will strain the balance of power in the region. The nationalistic sentiment will also play a role in the policy determinations of India and Pakistan.
Technology in nuclear armaments is widespread and tougher standards must be used by Western states. Proliferation of material and technology will tip the strategic balance of power on the South Asian continent.
The ultimate restraint would be a collective agreement in which all parties would agree to denuclearization in South Asia. Economic incentives would be a key to such a proposal and the promise of a regional security agreement that would foster trust and cooperation in South Asia.
Notes
1. Robert Gilpin. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 7.
2. Ibid.
3. Vijai K. Nair. 1994. "Nuclear Proliferation: U.S. Aims and India's Response."
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Volume 17, Number 2, April-June, 1.
4. Kenneth N. Waltz. 1993. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." International Security. Volume 18, Number 2, Fall, 47.
5. Stephen Philip Cohen. 1991. Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control. Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 192.
6. Ibid.
7. David Albright. "India, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: All The Pieces In Place." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Vol. 46, June 1989, 20.
8. Rodney W. Jones. 1992. "Old Quarrels and New Realities: Security in Southern Asia After the Cold War." The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 106.
9. S.P. Shulka. 1984. India and Pakistan: The Origins of Armed Conflict. New Delhi, India: Deep and Deep Publications. 4.
10. Vernon Marston Hewitt. 1992. The International Politics of South Asia. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 28.
11. S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring. 1990. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 18.
12. Hewitt, op.cit., 28.
13. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. 1965. "Kashmir, India, and Pakistan" Foreign Affairs. April, 528.
14. S.M. Burke, op.cit., 21.
15. Ibid.
16. Hewitt, op.cit., 29
17. James Clad, 1992. "India:Crisis and Transition." The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 94.
18. Craig Baxter. et al. 1991. Government and Politics in South Asia. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. 41.
19. Ibid.
20. S.M. Burke, op.cit., 5.
21. Jawarharlal Nehru. 1960. Discovery of India. London: Meridian Books. 63.
22. S. Radhakrishnan. 1959. Eastern Religions and Western Thought: 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 312.
23. Nehru, Ibid.
24. G.T. Garratt. 1951. Legacy of India. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 268.
25. B.R. Ambedkar. 1946. Pakistan or the Partition of India. Bombay: Thacher and Co. 119.
26. Quran, 49:10.
27. Shamloo. ed. 1948. Speeches and Statements of Iqbal. Lahore: Al-Manar Academy. 234.
28. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad. 1960. Speeches and Writings of Jinnah I .Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf. 64.
29. Burke, Ibid.
30. The Economist. "India: Birth of a Monster." 10 September 1994. 36.
31. Baxter, op.cit., 148-149.
32. Baxter, Ibid.
33. Clad, op.cit., 103.
34. Jones, op.cit., 112.
35. Hewitt, op.cit., 106.
36. Ibid.
37. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 1993. Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments: A Directory. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency: Directorate of Intelligence. 37-38.
38. Baxter, op.cit., 135.
39. Ibid.
40. Hewitt, op.cit., 104.
41. Caroline Thomas, "New directions in thinking about security in the Third World", in Ken Booth. 1991. ed. New Thinking About Strategy and International Security. London. 267-86.
42. Jones, Ibid., 112.
43. Brahma Chellaney. 1991."South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power." International Security Vol. 16, Issue 1, 43.
44. The Economist. "The International Order: Situation, Mission, Execution." 24 December 1994 - 6 January 1994. 17.
45. Jones, op.cit., 107.
46. Chellaney, op.cit., 44.
47. Ibid., 45.
48. George H. Quester and Victor A Utgoff. 1994. "Toward and International Nuclear Security Policy." The Washington Quarterly. Autumn: 7.
49. Cohen, op.cit., 41-42.
50. Chellaney, op.cit., 48-49.
51. David Frost interview with Benazir Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan. Public Broadcast System (PBS), New York: WNET. 18 November 1994.
52. Ibid.
53. Albright, Ibid., 20.
54. Jones, op.cit., 112-113.
55. Cohen, op.cit., 35-36.
56. Chellaney, op.cit., 59.
57. Jonathan Dean. 1992. "The Final Stage of Nuclear Arms Control." The Washington Quarterly. Autumn: 32.
58. Chellaney, op.cit., 52.
59. Doug Bandow. 1994. "LetÕEM Have Nukes." The New York Times Magazine, November 13, 56.
60. Albright, op.cit., 26.
61. Quester, Ibid., 7
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